Since March 2006 Brazil has been the ninth country to control the full nuclear fuel cycle.
Introduction
When Brazil puts the uranium enrichment plant Resende II into operation shortly, it will be the ninth country of the world to control the full nuclear fuel cycle. The government of President Lula da Silva refuses the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the inspection of the ultracentrifuge, which represents the heart of the plant. This way Brasilia wants to protect its innovative technology from industrial spying. While the U.S. government bashes the uranium enrichment activities in Iran, it has come to an arrangement concerning the uranium enrichment in its geostrategic backyard after temporary diplomatic tensions with the Brazilian regional leader.
As a signer of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil has the right for peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time the members of the regime are obliged to allow the IAEAinspectors the control of their plants. Uranium enrichment plants in particular may be used for civil as well as military purposes (dual use-technology) and are therefore considered to be a milestone on the way towards being a nuclear power. Consequently, at the verification conference of the NPT in May 2005, the previous nuclear weapon states -especially the U.S. -tried to restrict the sensitive enrichment and recycling technologies to the present technology owners. Just like the other non-nuclear weapon states, Brazil was not willing to give up the right for uranium enrichment, but makes use of it instead now. Against this background, the present article will deal with the following questions: What are the goals and issues of the current Brazilian nuclear policy? How does it fit into the international nonproliferation regime? What influence does it bear on the bilateral relations with the U.S. as determining actor of global nuclear policy? Subsequently, the Brazilian military governments -the striving for nuclear weapons which became more and more obvious in the context of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry -tried to get new cooperation partners. When the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to do business with the authoritarian government of Ernesto Geisel it was again the White House that vetoed the planned transfer of technology. Only when re-democratized Brazil was integrating itself into the net of international nuclear control regimes during the 1990s, the relations with the U.S. improved increasingly.
On the one hand, a trusting cooperation between Washington and Brasilia has resulted, which is in the meantime also marked by the acceptance of the Brazilian claim to regional leadership. On the other hand, the U.S. government's nuclear and security policy does currently not focus on Latin America. The escalation of the conflict of the international community with the Iranian regime moves Brazil's nuclear policy into the background as well as the latest nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. The cooperation with the non-signer of the NPT marks a U-turn of Washington's foreign policy after all. Only Brasilia's intention to cooperate with opponents of Washington allows the nuclear ambitions of the Amazon state to come to the fore again. The government da Silva discusses cooperation possibilities concerning civil utilization of atomic energy with the Chavist Venezuela as well as China, the ascending global rival of the United States. President Chávez, whom U.S. Sec-retary of State Rice describes as a "negative factor in the hemisphere" and who does not try to hide his good relations with the OPEC-partner Iran, would like to integrate Teheran into the nuclear cooperation with Brasilia.
It is questionable how Brazil will position itself on the far field of the global nuclear policy in the future: Is the striving for nuclear weapons and the opting out of the NPT, following the Indian example, a realistic option for the Brazilian government? Alternatively, will the aspirant to a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council confine itself to the civil use of nuclear energy in order to overcome its chronic scarcity of energy? Both options would lead to the preference for different partners in the nuclear cooperation. From the U.S. foreign policy's point of view the question raises, how the good relation with the regional leader Brazil can be maintained on the one hand and how the global proliferation risk can be kept small on the other hand. Furthermore, the government of President Bush has to be concerned with not losing entirely its credibility and authority as global nuclear leader despite the different dealing with the nuclear ambitions of Brazil, India and Iran.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Basic Problems
The NPT was concluded on 1 July 1968 on the initiative of the USA, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and became effective in 1970, after it had been ratified by 147 states. To date 188 countries have signed the treaty. It is meant to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to enable also non-atomic-powers to peaceful use. The treaty defines proliferation as production or acquisition of nuclear explosive charges by all the states that have not tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 -therefore all the states except for the USA, the Soviet Union (respectively Russia), France, China and Great Britain, which count by it as official nuclear powers. According to the treaty, the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient is prohibited (article I). The remaining 183 countries, amongst them Brazil, that have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states must not change their status of non-nuclear weapon states according to article II of the NPT. By article VI of the NPT all parties are obliged to a general and complete nuclear disarmament. In practise this applies to the nuclear powers. The NPT and its Additional Protocol make the nuclear-technological progress of the emerging and developing countries more difficult even in the sector of civil research and use. After all, "paradoxically it has the effect of disarming the unarmed", as the former Argentine U.N.
Ambassador José María Ruda notices quite accurately (quoted in La Nación, 18 April 2004).
Particularly regarding those states with a developing nuclear industry on the one side and not belonging to any military alliance (Argentina, Brazil) -especially during the Cold Waron the other side, the NPT did not provide favourable starting points for the scientifictechnological process in the nuclear sector. The technological dependence Brazil considers itself to be caught in seems to be the price for the prevention of the potential abuse of nuclear technology, since passing on nuclear technology to irresponsible states and other actors is a precondition of its abuse.
The international regimes for the control of means of nuclear mass destruction have not turned out to be very effective. This is particularly shown by the nuclear bomb tests firstly by India and shortly after by Pakistan, the presentation of the North Korean long-range missile as well as the discovery of a parallel nuclear project in Iran. Especially those states that have not signed respectively cancelled the NPT, but are demonstrably in the possession of nuclear weapons (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) undermine the NPT considerably.
In order to reduce the proliferation risk and to reinforce the NPT these states would also have to be included in the non-proliferation regime. However, not demanding a membership as non-nuclear weapon country from them without compromising the central terms of the contract at the same time is similar to the squaring of the circle (Müller 2005: 3) . The mentioned states are little willing to negotiate because their nuclear weapons give them leverage in foreign policy and keep hostile states at a distance. Jonathan Shell (see 2000) also comes to this conclusion. In his Foreign Affairs-article "The Folly of Arms Control" he describes the proliferation as a kind of stepchild of the deterrence logic of the Cold War, which militarily inferior states use in order to protect themselves against (preventive) efforts for intervention by more powerful actors.
The failing of the seventh verification conference of the NPT in May 2005 in New York is characteristic of the crisis of the regulation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons according to international law. Contrasting interests of the nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states were the reason for this. At first the U.S. government (tacitly supported by France) refused to accept the hard fought for compromise of the verification conference from 2000 with its disarmament program of the "13 steps". As a result of this attitude the nonnuclear weapon states rejected any strengthening of the non-proliferation aspects of the regime like verification, export controls, conviction of violators of the contract and institutional reform (Müller 2005: 2) . Another area of conflict that became obvious during the conference refers to the right of all parties of the treaty for the unhindered peaceful use of the nuclear energy guaranteed in article IV of the NPT. So the non-nuclear weapon states must have understood U.S. President Bush's request for restricting even the civil operation of enrichment and recycling to the present technology-owners and to achieve this by strict transfer refusal if necessary as a frontal attack to their rights from article IV. In contrast to President Bush, a group of experts of the IAEA examining options for internationalising the sensitive dual-use-technology (including a system for the guarantee of fuel deliveries) came to the result that a step of this kind is only possible at present if it is done voluntarily. An amendment of the NPT to the debit of the non-nuclear weapon countries were only thinkable in connection with considerable disarmament contributions of the nuclear weapon states and only if the new rule applies to all without exception (IAEA 2005 , quoted in Müller 2005 . The U.S. delegation regarded this balancing of interests as unacceptable again. Finally the conference failed and the non-nuclear weapon states continued to insist on their right to enrich nuclear fuel for civil use. One year later Brazil, who was holding the presidency of the New York conference and therefore playing a neutral role, made use of this right.
Brazil's Nuclear Policy in Historical Perspective
Bilateral Relations after World War II: Brazil's Futile Waiting for U.S. Nuclear
Know-how
In the 1940s the topic of the Brazilian nuclear policy was addressed by the agenda of the bilateral relations between the USA and Brazil for the first time. After great sources of uranium had been discovered in Brazil one decade earlier, President Getúlio Vargas concluded an agreement on common uranium exploitation with the USA. Three subsequent agreements were intended: Brazil should be compensated for its uranium supplies by nuclear berto da Mota e Silva suggested the principle of specific compensations instead, which should have allowed Brazil the further construction of nuclear reactors on its territory in return for natural uranium supplies.
In order to prevent the unregulated uranium exportation in 1951 the National Research Council (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas -CNPq) was founded in Rio de Janeiro. In February 1952 the two governments concluded an agreement on the sale of Brazilian uranium. However, the U.S. refused its trading partner "specific compensations" and the transfer of technology for the development of the Brazilian atomic energy sector failed to happen again (ComCiência 2004: 9) .
When it became public that German technology was delivered to Brazil for the construction of three uranium enrichment centrifuges in 1954, the South American country's intentions of acquiring nuclear technology became evident again. It has been an open secret that the nuclear technology was also intended to be for military use (Schirm 1994: 194) . However, the import of the German ultra-centrifuge-method failed due to the U.S. occupying power, which prohibited the transport of the centrifuges to South America.
Vice-President João Café Filho's (1954 Filho's ( -1956 ) assumption of the state affairs led only to shorttime stabilization of the relations with Washington, which Brazil criticised for being one- Juscelino Kubitschek (1956 Kubitschek ( -1961 launched the so-called Pan-American Operation (Operação Pan-Americana -OPA), which was meant to intensify the general bilateral cooperation between Brazil and the USA and aimed besides an economic collaboration also at a political one. The longer the aligned confrontation continued the less attention the USA paid to Brazil. In the end Kubitschek cancelled the common program for the research of the Brazilian uranium sources. He justified this step by lacking advantages for Brazil, since the U.S. government had not agreed to the know-how transfer for the nuclear cycle. In 1956 the IAEA, based in Vienna, as well as the National Nuclear Energy Commission (Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear -CNEN) was founded. At the same time the latter was also assigned to function as a national board of control (licensing, reactor safety) and to coordinate the sector of nuclear research and development. Besides civil use, the development of the military nuclear capabilities was the prime objective (Heinz 2001: 251) , even though this is partially denied in Brazil (Wrobel 1996: 339) . Despite all discrepancies, in July 1957 the first two research reactors resulting from U.S.-Brazilian cooperation were opened. Accordingly, the independent foreign policy of the Goulart government (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) 1974 -1976 ) and Carter administrations (1977 -1980 tried to put the government in Bonn off the trade and threatened it with sanctions (Moniz Bandeira 1994: 219).
Finally the German parliament imposed a moratorium in order to postpone for four years further German-Brazilian plans . In March 1977 Washington finally succeeded in preventing the official Brazilian-German nuclear cooperation. Since the Netherlands and Great Britain had been involved in the German uranium enrichment technology through the Uranium Enrichment Company (URENCO) and spoken against the trade with Brazil, the agreement was thwarted in the end. Altogether the mentioned problems led to a considerable delay. As a result the test phase at Angra II could only be assumed in 2000.
The main reason for Washington's negative attitude towards a technology transfer was Brazil's intention of passing atomic know-how and exporting nuclear power plants to other developing countries (Schirm 1994: 195) . On the one side the U.S. government feared the destabilization of the international system and a reduction of its global dominance. On the other side well developed commercial interests came into play, since the U.S. delivered 90% of the reactors traded on the world market at the end of the 1970s (Luis Bitencourt, interview fication of the NPT by Brazil and other developing countries with the ultimate aim of perpetuating the balances of nuclear power.
Recent publications point out that already the Geisel administration had not agreed to confine itself to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Gaspari (2004: 129) "We have got to look at the strategic and political advantages of each single country that has got the capability to cause a nuclear detonation. This applies especially to those states interested in restoring their prestige within the international relations."
Within the familiar circle of his generals, President Geisel also explained that in view of the Argentine progresses in the nuclear research one had to intensify one's own efforts:
"So we try to develop a technology, which allows us to produce those nuclear weapons that the others on, the Navy was assigned to the sole responsibility for the nuclear research program. Wöhlcke (1987: 124) identifies five motives of the Brazilian Armed Forces for the striving for nuclear weapons: (1) a demonstration of power directed to the civil society; (2) a symbolic demonstration of independence with regard to the hegemonic policy of the USA; (3) the emphasis of the regional claim to leadership; (4) the upgrading of the status within the international system to an important Third World-power; (5) the reaction to Argentina's atomic bomb program that was probably being developed.
Again the U.S. reacted with disapproving astonishment to the efforts for nuclear power in its backyard. Moreover, President Carter criticised the state of the human rights and the "case of Brazil" was put on the foreign policy agenda. On the whole the divergences in human rights, non-proliferation and nuclear policy led to the further cooling of the relations between Washington and Brasilia (Soares de Lima 2000: 74) . In the end the U.S. imposed economic sanctions against Brazil, prevented World Bank credits and loans from private banks connected with them, since they could also be used for the military nuclear program. The positive agenda of the bilateral relations with the U.S. produced by President Collor de Melo was threatened by the first Gulf War in the end (Schirm 1994: 191) Furthermore a far-reaching change within the nuclear and arms policy remained missing, which also would have been difficult to convey to the powerful Brazilian Armed Forces. In view of the virtually non-existent civil supremacy in Brazil concerning security matters at that time the question remains, whether the President possessed the necessary autonomy to drop the military nuclear program. As far as this goes, one has to agree with Schirm (1994: 198f.) who points out:
Nuclear Policy of the
"In order to win the influence on the nuclear activities in his own country, Collor would have had to withhold the control over the program from the military. However, he was either not willing or not able to do so.
[…] On the whole Brazil's concession was not of a profound character and the country could generally continue with its policy of reserved independence in the arms industry and nuclear bomb sector." The ratification of the NPT is based on a pragmatic decision by Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
After all by the Tlatelolco-Treaty and especially by the ABACC Brazil had already met all control commitments the NPT implied -including the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. In order to maintain the chances of a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council and to position itself as a global actor, it was important to ratify the NPT -already ratified by 148 statesand to consolidate the profile of a responsible actor in the international relations by this.
Nevertheless, the former dependence theorist Cardoso did not move away from considering the NPT to be a discriminating instrument. The Brazilian government was far more concerned with improving the possibilities for Brazil's participation within the international system. Accordingly, Brazil and the USA were further moving towards an agreement on nuclear and arms policy issues during the two Cardoso terms (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . In the 1990s the two governments signed bilateral agreements on the usage of the Brazilian missile base in Alcântara by the USA: One space-agreement and one agreement on the common peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. According to official information, only six states worldwide possess the ultra-centrifugeprocedure at the moment: Russia, China and Japan as well as the European syndicate Urenco, in which Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are involved. In France and in the USA the natural uranium is enriched by the gas-diffusion-procedure, which is by now rated as comparatively outdated and cost-intensive. It has so far not entirely been clarified which enrichmentprocedure Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea as well as -if applicable -Iran and Libya rely on. The IAEA reproaches the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan with acquiring the ultracentrifuge-technology of the Urenco by industrial espionage in Europe and passing it on to Iran, Lybia and North Korea afterwards. By the international treaties Brazil has committed itself not to exceed the enrichment degree of 20% 6 . The production of a nuclear explosive charge requires an enrichment degree of 90% at least. According to the information of the INB the uranium in Resende II can only be enriched up to 5%, which is sufficient for the production of electric energy in nuclear power plants. The nuclear reactor of a nuclear operated submarine needs an enrichment degree of up to 20%. The Brazilian Navy has been working on the development of a nuclear powered submarine over decades and forecasts its opening for 2015 respectively 2018. One concern of the IAEA might be that the ultra centrifuge in Resende II is technically capable of exceeding 6 The IAEA defines uranium up to 20% enrichment as "low enriched uranium". For the production of nuclear energy the isotope U 235 is usually enriched up to 5%, while natural uranium consists only to 0,7% of the isotopes of the type U 235. the allowed enrichment degree and possibly producing plutonium suitable for the production of weapons.
Brazil's Nuclear Policy under President da
The mentioned ultracentrifuge has been developed at the research centres of the Brazilian Navy, especially at the Centro Experimental Aramar (Federal State São Paulo), which has devoted itself to the project of the nuclear powered submarine 7 since 1979. The head of the military nuclear research centre Aramar, Rear Admiral Alan Arthou, holds the view that the Brazilian centrifuge technology is technically superior to the U.S. and European procedures.
The more efficient and cost-saving enrichment method is based on a magnetic pending procedure, by which there is no frictional resistance at the more than 1,000 rotations per second.
Therefore the ultracentrifuge can do without water-cooling and works almost silently 
Strategic Divergence of Interest: Securing Energy Resources and Uranium Trade
Brazil and the USA pursue their interests against a common nature-historical background:
The foreseeable end of oil, gas and coal reserves. With 439 reactors in 31 states nuclear energy covers currently already 16 per cent of the worldwide energy production. In view of the increasing demand for electric energy that is to be expected the forecasts proceed from the assumption that the number of reactors will be multiplied by five over the next decades.
At the same time the capacity of each reactor will be multiplied by four (Brigagão 2004: 2) . 
Prospects of Brazil's Role in Global Nuclear Policy
Since the beginning of 2006, the Brazilian nuclear policy has been given international attention again. Firstly, the complete starting of the uranium enrichment plant in Resende II coincides with the growing diplomatic conflict over the uranium enrichment in Iran. Secondly, Washington increasingly criticises Brazilian cooperation plans in the field of the civil use of nuclear energy with partners such as Venezuela and China. Thirdly, the U.S. government concluded a nuclear agreement with India in order to counterbalance the Brazilian cooperation partner China, although Delhi has not signed the NPT.
The Comparison with Iran
The simultaneousness of the enrichment activities of the NPT-signatory states Brazil and
Iran calls for comparison especially in view of the different dealing with them by the international community. Titled "Brazil Going Nuclear" in the conservative news magazine The New American, William Norman Grigg reminds of Brazil's secret military nuclear program that was stopped 15 years ago before he draws a real horror scenario:
"The parallels between Brazil's nuclear ambitions and Iran's are numerous and striking. One critical strategic difference is found in the fact that if Marxist-led Brazil became a full-fledged member of the nuclear weapon club, its alliance with Beijing, its developing space program, and its proximity to the U.S. would make it a far greater potential threat than Iran could ever be" (see The New American, 26 February 2006).
In the less polemic article "Brazil poised to join the world's nuclear elite" it is emphasised that since its re-democratisation Brazil has presented itself as a responsible member of the world community, which is neither striving for nuclear weapons nor threatening any other It is true that these differences between the Brazilian and the Iranian case also justify a different dealing by the U.S. government as well as the United Nations with the nuclear ambitions of the two states. Nevertheless, an observation of the IAEA-Director Muhammad El Baradei has to be considered generally:
"As soon as states possess the civil enrichment technology and subsequently a great quantity of enriched uranium and plutonium, the step to military use is so small that the IAEA can hardly control it" (see Financial Times, 2 February 2005).
So far, at least two arguments should be taken into consideration before legitimising Brasilia to become the ninth country of the world to enrich uranium.
Firstly, a change of nuclear policy within the Brazilian elite against the background of a changing global security situation cannot be excluded medium-term. Especially the nuclear weapon arsenals of North Korea and Pakistan (soon maybe Iran and Libya) involve a risk for all non-nuclear-weapon-countries that is difficult to calculate. Moreover, the second U.S.- In contrast to the cooperation on the South American level, the mutual advantage of Brazilian -Chinese cooperation is obvious. China is keen on imports of Brazilian uranium in order to secure the supply of its growing nuclear sector. In return, Peking is expected to invest in the Brazilian nuclear program, which is financially weak. Furthermore, the half-state-owned
Brazilian Nuclep is planned to participate in the construction of Chinese nuclear plants. The
Nuclep has planned and built Angra I and II. If a deal of this kind will actually be put into practice, is highly questionable, though. So far, Brazilian laws prohibit the export of crude uranium, which is defined as a strategic resource. An amendment of law is thinkable, but the Congress would have to confirm it. The CNEN is instructed to produce a report for the President, which might result in an adequate bill. Apart from the representatives of the Presidential Office, the commission consists of envoys of the Ministries for Energy and Mining, Environmental Protection, Science and Technology, Planning as well as Industry and
Commerce. In contrast to difficult planning of the nuclear cooperation, numerous achievements can be proven in the field of civil air and space cooperation, since Brazil and China have agreed on their "strategic partnership" in 1993. In 1999 and 2003, the two states placed 11 In January 2006 Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement on the construction of an 8,000 kilometres long gas pipeline through the whole of South America. Apart from that, the gasand oil deposits in San Jorge (Argentina) and the Orinoko Basin (Veneuela) are planned to be commonly exploited. In 2005 Brasilia and Caracas agreed on common investments in oil refinery and gas-production projects of the amount of 3.5 billion U.S. dollars.
two commonly built satellites (CBER-1 and CBER-2). Three more bilateral satellite projects are planned for the following years.
The Strategic Partnership between Washington and Delhi
In March 2006, the USA and India founded a "strategic partnership", too. In the context of a bilateral treaty on the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Washington will supply Delhi with the latest nuclear power stations and enriched uranium. Furthermore, the U.S. wants to sell F-16 and F-18 combat aircrafts to India. During President Bush's visit to India, the Pentagon announced:
"It is our aim to support India in covering its requirements in the defence sector.
[…]We want to deliver important skills and technologies, which India strives for" (quoted in: Die Welt, 3 March 2006).
In return, the Indian government commits itself for the first time to putting a part of its nuclear installations in charge of the IAEA-controls. Nevertheless, India insisted on excluding eight of its 22 reactors from it. This way the Indian military can continue to produce fissile material for nuclear warheads. Delhi will not open its "fast breeders", which produce vast amounts of weapon-grade plutonium, for international controls. Before the treaty becomes effective, the U.S. Congress has to ratify it. So far, the technology transfer to states not signing the NPT is lawfully prohibited in the USA. Additionally, the Nuclear Supplier Group must agree.
As far as the cooperation with India is concerned, the government of President Bush is above all interested in counterbalancing China in Asia. The moderation of the global oil competition might be another aim of Washington. Just like China, even India, which is growing by more than seven percent a year, has an enormous energy demand and will become a rival to the U.S. over oil reserves in the Far and Middle East. Internally the rapprochement with the USA is highly controversial in India. The opposition criticises the agreement as "carte blanche" for Washington to capture and instrumentalize India. By the delivery of enriched uranium as fuel for the Indian nuclear plants, the U.S. government has a means for putting pressure on the Indian breeder program or the nuclear weapon research, parts of the Indian nuclear establishment say. These critics also regard the foreign policy manoeuvring space as restricted. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thought it necessary to state explicitly that India's latest vote against Iran in the IAEA goes back to its miserable willingness to cooperate and not to U.S. pressure (see Guardian, 24 February 2006) .
How must the agreement between India and the USA be assessed in view of the containment of proliferation? Positively, because India is now rewarded for not passing on its nu-clear weapon technique to other countries -unlike Pakistan. One could argue that each agreement allowing the IAEA more inspection rights implies a progress.
Surely, those member states of the NPT that have done without the development of nuclear weapons must feel insulted. They might get the impression as if it had been wiser not to sign the treaty and to develop nuclear weapons in order to be rewarded by nuclear cooperation.
This applies to Brazil, for example, which has qualified itself for an intensification of the nuclear cooperation with the USA just like India by its good behaviour -should Washington apply the same standards. In other words: The Indian precedent weakens the international consensus against the passing on of nuclear technology. The comparison of the Indian with the Iranian case leads to a similar conclusion: Who signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty is sanctioned, because he does not comply with its rules. Who refuses to sign is forgiven anything he develops independently -including nuclear weapons.
In the end, the U.S. has lost even more moral authority within the global nuclear policy by its rapprochement with India. This had been decimated anyway, because the superpower does not fulfil its duty of disarming its nuclear weapon arsenals as laid down in the NPT (see Thränert 2004) . By this, the arguments of the White House concerning the containment of Iran's and North Korea's nuclear weapon programs lose their powers of persuasion strongly. As far as that goes, even from Washington's perspective, it might (prove to) be wrong to give counterbalancing China more priority than the principle of the nonproliferation. A stronger support in competing for a permanent seat in reformed U.N. Security Council would have been an alternative to the consolidation of the Indian regional power. Overall, the so-called strategic partnership between India and the USA is an exemplary for the triumph of unilateral power politics over the aim of nuclear weapon reduction, which is codified in international law.
Conclusion
The Brazilian nuclear program is under extensive international control. As long as Brazil does withdraw from the NPT neither the IAEA nor the U.S. State Department has to become alarmed. If Brasilia in the medium-term and against all expectations were to consider this option in order to develop nuclear weapons after all, Washington would have considerably contributed to this development in view of the Indian example. Nevertheless, from today's perspective a scenario of this kind seems as unlikely as the passing on of Brazilian enrichment technology to the Chavist Venezuela. After all, President da Silva's foreign policy course (just like the one of his predecessor Cardoso) aims at Brazil's establishing as decision maker within the international system. The aspirant to a permanent seat in the Security Council will not put its hard-earned international prestige at risk in order to invest in a nuclear weapon project, which is hardly eligible for financing anyway. Washington's acceptance of the Brazilian claim to regional leadership is not reflected by the fact that the U.S.
government has finally come to terms with the Brazilian uranium enrichment in Resende.
Brasilia's commitment in Haiti contributes to this. The U.S. who has reached its limits of power projection capacities acknowledges this gratefully. Furthermore, the Brazilian president is regarded as an honest actor in the White House concerning the considerably strained relations with the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia. In summary, realizing the dependence on strong partners in the different world regions explains the Bush government's Brazil policy that is marked by acceptance and trust 12 . Preferred partners are highly populated democracies with high growth potential and regional leader status. Both Brazil and India present themselves -in the context of the WTO-negotiations, for instance -as actors of the international system that are equally led by clear national interests and therefore calculable.
The Indian case differs from the Brazilian one mainly in the U.S. strategic interest in winning India as long-term ally against China. From this perspective, conventional arm deliveries seem to be an opportune decision and the acceptance of the Indian nuclear weapons a necessity of Realpolitik. After all the bilateral cooperation in civil use of nuclear energy serves the purpose of reducing the pressure on the global energy market. In view of these higher strategic aims, the undermining of the anyway outdated Non-Proliferation Treaty is an acceptable collateral damage for Washington. As far as this goes, the nuclear cooperation with a non-NPT-signatory state marks new territory for the USA. Nevertheless, by the safety de- one of very few countries, which have enormous uranium deposits and an efficient enrichment technology at the same time. If the currently starting social debate on the pro and contra of nuclear energy in Brazil results in an expansion of the nuclear sector, the scenario of a civil nuclear power is most likely for the Amazon state.
